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Abstract
There has been rapidly growing interest in the use of algorithms for employment assessment,
especially as a means to address or mitigate bias in hiring. Yet, to date, little is known about
how these methods are being used in practice. How are algorithmic assessments built, vali-
dated, and examined for bias? In this work, we document and assess the claims and practices
of companies offering algorithms for employment assessment, using a methodology that can be
applied to evaluate similar applications and issues of bias in other domains. In particular, we
identify vendors of algorithmic pre-employment assessments (i.e., algorithms to screen candi-
dates), document what they have disclosed about their development and validation procedures,
and evaluate their techniques for detecting and mitigating bias. We find that companies’ for-
mulation of “bias” varies, as do their approaches to dealing with it. We also discuss the various
choices vendors make regarding data collection and prediction targets, in light of the risks and
trade-offs that these choices pose. We consider the implications of these choices and we raise a
number of technical and legal considerations.
1 Introduction
The study of algorithmic bias and fairness in machine learning has quickly matured into a field of
study in its own right, delivering a wide range of formal definitions and quantitative metrics. As
industry takes up these tools and accompanying terminology, promises of eliminating algorithmic
bias using computational methods have begun to proliferate. At first glance, it might appear that
social and academic pressure for companies to consider normative goals when building algorithms
has led to positive industry change in these areas, and indeed, many companies have publicly
responded to these calls for improvement.1 In some cases, however, rather than forcing precision
and specificity, the existence of formal definitions and metrics has had the paradoxical result of
giving undue credence to vague claims about “de-biasing” and “fairness.”
In this work, we use algorithmic pre-employment assessment as a case study to show how
formal definitions and metrics of fairness allow us to ask focused questions about the meaning of
“fair” and “unbiased” models. Thus, rather than viewing these as a way to “solve” bias, we see
these definitions and metrics as providing a concrete way to analyze the claims and practices of
industry: computational approaches to fairness give us a framework to guide empirical research
about companies’ practices.
One of the biggest obstacles to empirically characterizing industry practices is the lack of pub-
licly available information. Much technical work has focused on using computational notions of
equity and fairness to evaluate specific models or datasets [2, 12]. Indeed, when these models are
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1See, e.g., I.B.M.’s “Diversity in Faces” project [73] and Microsoft’s response to critical research [61].
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available, we can and should investigate them to identify potential points of concern. But what do
we do when we have little or no access to models or the data that they produce? Certain models
may be completely inaccessible to the public, whether for practical or legal reasons, and attempts
to audit these models by examining their training data or outputs might place users’ privacy at
risk. As we study algorithmic pre-employment assessments, we find that this is very much the case:
models, much less the sensitive employee data used to construct them, are in general inaccessible
to researchers and the general public. As such, the only information we can consistently glean
about industry practices is limited to what companies publicly disclose. Despite this, one of the
key findings of our work is that even if we do not have access to models or data, we can still
learn a considerable amount by investigating what corporations disclose about their practices for
developing, validating, and removing bias from these tools.
Documenting claims and evaluating practices. A great deal of work on algorithmic fair-
ness considers hiring as a motivating example of the risks of discrimination that warrant careful
attention. Despite this, we have little concrete information about how industry has handled these
concerns when adopting algorithmic techniques. In this work, we seek to shed further light on algo-
rithmic hiring by examining vendors of algorithmic pre-employment assessments, who provide tools
to quantitatively evaluate job-seekers for hiring purposes. Following a review of firms offering re-
cruitment technologies, we identify 19 vendors of pre-employment assessments. We document what
each company has disclosed about their practices and consider the implications of these claims. In
so doing, we develop an understanding of how attempts to address bias have take place in industry
practice and what critical issues these have been left unaddressed.
Prior work has sought to taxonomize the points at which bias can enter machine learning
systems [5, 47]. Barocas and Selbst describe how the choice of target variable, collection of training
data, labeling of examples, and measurement of features are all potential sources of disparities [5].
Similarly, Kleinberg et al. note that discrimination can result from the choice of outcome, choice of
features, or choice of training algorithm [47]. Following these frameworks, we seek to understand
how practitioners handle these key decisions in the machine learning pipeline. In particular, we
surface choices and trade-offs vendors face with regards to the collection of data, the ability to
validate on representative populations, and the effects of discrimination law on efforts to prevent
bias. The heterogeneity we observe in vendors’ practices indicates an evolving industry norms that
are sensitive to concerns of bias but lack clear guidance on how to respond to these worries.
Of course, analyzing publicly available information has its limitations. We are unable, for
example, to identify issues that any particular model might raise in practice. Nor can we be sure
that vendors aren’t doing more behind the scenes to ensure that their models are non-discriminatory.
And while other publicly accessible information (e.g., news articles and videos from conferences)
might offer further details about vendors’ practices, for the sake of consistent comparison, we
limit ourselves to statements on vendors’ websites. As such, our analysis should not be viewed
as exhaustive; however, as we will see, it is still possible to draw meaningful conclusions and
characterize industry trends from the information we consider.
We stress that our analysis is not intended as an expose´ of industry practices. Many of the
vendors we study exist precisely because their founders seek to provide a fairer alternative to
traditional hiring practices known to be problematic. Our hope is that this work will paint a
realistic picture of the landscape of algorithmic techniques in pre-employment assessment and offer
some recommendations for their effective and appropriate use.
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Organization of the rest of the paper. Section 2 contains an overview of pre-employment
assessments, their history, and the legal precedents surrounding them. In Section 3, we systemati-
cally review vendors of algorithmic screening tools and provide empirical findings on their practices
based on the claims that they make. We analyze these practices in detail in Section 4, examining
particular causes for concern and providing recommendations. We provide concluding thoughts in
Section 5.
2 Background
Pre-employment assessments in the hiring pipeline. Hiring decisions are among the most
consequential that individuals face, determining key aspects of their lives, including where they
live and how much they earn. These decisions are similarly impactful for employers, who face
significant financial pressure to make high-quality hires quickly and efficiently. The Society for
Human Resource Management estimates that the average time to fill a position in 2016 was over a
month [52]. As a result, many employers seek tools with which to optimize their hiring processes.
The hiring pipeline consists of a series of stages leading to offers being made to chosen candidates.
Broadly speaking, there are four distinct stages, though the boundaries between them are not
always rigid: sourcing, screening, interviewing, and selection [10]. Sourcing consists of building a
candidate pool, which is then screened to choose a subset to interview. Finally, after candidates are
interviewed, selected candidates receive offers. Our work will focus on the screening stage, and in
particular, pre-employment assessments that use algorithmic techniques to assess candidates. This
includes, for example, questionnaires and video interviews that are analyzed automatically.
Prior work has considered the rise of algorithmic tools in the context of hiring, along with the
concerns that they raise for fairness. For example, Bogen and Rieke provide an overview of the
various ways in which algorithms are being introduced into this pipeline, with a particular focus
on their implications for equity [10]. Garr surveys a number of platforms designed to promote
diversity and inclusion in hiring [34]. Broadly considering the use of data science in HR-related
activities, Cappelli et al. identify a number of challenges and propose a framework to help address
them [14]. Ajunwa provides a legal framework to consider the problems algorithmic tools introduce
and argues against subjective targets like “cultural fit” [1].
It is important to note that even in the absence of algorithms, the hiring process is widely
acknowledged to be fraught with bias. A well-known study by Bertrand and Mullainathan demon-
strated that given identical resumes, employer response rates were significantly higher when can-
didates had names that suggested they were white males as compared to other groups [9]. This
results of this study, and others like them [8, 7, 43], are widely accepted in the world of human
resources, where practitioners continually seek new ways of handling bias [49]. Advocates argue
for algorithmic techniques as a means to address bias [16, 27], and indeed, there is some evidence
that they can be used to combat human idiosyncrasies [40, 46]. However, while these tools have
the potential to mitigate certain human biases, they run the risk of reinforcing or creating new
inequalities as well.
A history of equity concerns in assessment. Pre-employment assessments have a long his-
tory, beginning with examinations for the Chinese civil service thousands of years ago [38]. In the
early 1900’s, the idea that assessments could reveal innate cognitive abilities gained traction in both
industrial and academic circles, leading to the formation of Industrial Psychology as an academic
discipline [54, 35, 44]. During the two World Wars, the US government turned to these assessments
in an attempt to quantify the abilities of its soldiers, paving the way for their widespread adoption
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in postwar industry [4, 30, 31]. Historically, these assessments were primarily behavioral or cogni-
tive in nature, like the Stanford-Binet IQ test [74], the Myers-Briggs type indicator [55], and the
Big Five personality traits [57]. Industrial-Organizational (IO) Psychology remains a prominent
component of these modern assessment tools—many vendors we examine employ a team of IO
psychologists who work in concert with data scientists to create and validate assessments.
More recently, scholars in the field of IO Psychology have also begun to grapple with the variety
of new pre-employment assessment methods and sources of information enabled by algorithms and
big data [37]. Chamorro-Prezumic et al. find that academic research has been unable to keep pace
with rapidly evolving technology, allowing vendors to push the boundaries of assessments without
rigorous independent research [15]. A 2013 report by the National Research Council summarizes
a number of ethical issues that arise in pre-employment assessment, including the role of human
intervention, the provision of feedback to candidates, and the goal of hiring for “fit,” especially in
light of modern data sources [26].
This is particularly worrying because cognitive assessments have imposed adverse impacts on
minority populations since their introduction into mainstream American use [75, 67, 25]. Critics
have long contended that observed group differences in test outcomes indicated flaws in the tests
themselves [28], and a growing consensus has formed around the idea that while assessments do
have some predictive validity, they often disadvantage minorities despite the fact that minority
candidates have similar real-world job performance to their white counterparts [25].2
In light of these concerns, the American Psychological Association (APA) includes appeals
to fairness and bias in its Principles for the Validation and Use of Personnel Selection Proce-
dures [32]. Recognizing that “fairness” is ill-defined and means different things to different stake-
holders, the APA instead cautions against predictive bias: systematic errors in predictions for a
certain group [32]. Moreover, while the APA Principles strive to equalize opportunity for candidates
of all backgrounds, they explicitly reject equalizing outcomes in the form of “equal passing rates
for subgroups of interest” [32]. As we will see, this rejection of outcome-based notions of bias forms
interesting connections and contrasts with U.S. employment discrimination law.
A brief overview of U.S. employment discrimination law. Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 forms the basis of regulatory oversight regarding discrimination in employment. It
prohibits discrimination with respect to a number of protected attributes (“race, color, religion,
sex and national origin”) and created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
to ensure compliance [21]. The EEOC, in turn, issued the Uniform Guidelines on Employment
Selection Procedures in 1978 to set standards for how employers can choose their employees.
According to the Uniform Guidelines [20], the gold standard for pre-employment assessments
is validity : the outcome of a test should say something meaningful about a candidate’s potential
as an employee. The EEOC accepts three forms of evidence for validity: criterion, content, and
construct. Criterion validity refers to the predictive ability of an assessment, and demonstrating
criterion validity entails demonstrating that test scores correlate with meaningful job outcomes
(e.g., sales numbers). An assessment with content validity tests candidates in similar situations
to ones that they will encounter on the job. Finally, assessments demonstrate construct validity
if they test for some construct (e.g., grit or leadership) that is required for good job performance.
This, so far, is in keeping with APA Principles, which place a similar emphasis on validity [32].
When is an assessment legally considered discriminatory? Based on existing precedent, the
2Disparities in assessment outcomes for minority populations are not limited to pre-employment assessments. In
the education literature, the adverse impact of assessments on minorities is well-documented [51]. This has led to a
decades-long line of literature seeking to measure and mitigate the observed disparities (see [41] for a survey).
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Uniform Guidelines provide two avenues to challenge an assessment: disparate treatment and
disparate impact [5]. Disparate treatment is relatively straightforward—it is illegal to explicitly
treat candidates differently based on categories protected under Title VII [20, 21]. Disparate impact
is more nuanced, and while we provide an overview of the process here, we refer the reader to [5]
for a more complete discussion.
Under the Uniform Guidelines, a case can be brought against an employer for disparate impact
if the selection rate for one protected group is less than 4/5 of that of another group [20]. Once this
disparity is established, an employer must respond by showing that the selection procedures that
it uses are both valid and necessary from a business perspective [20]. Moreover, an employer can
be held liable if the plaintiff can show the existence of an alternative selection procedure with less
adverse impact that the employer could have used instead with little business cost [20].3 Impor-
tantly, the Title VII and EEOC requirement of approximately equal selection rates via the 4/5 rule
conflicts with the APA Principles, although the APA Principles do point out that “group differences
[in selection rates] should trigger heightened scrutiny for possible sources of bias” [32]. Responding
to this inconsistency, psychologists have argued that the Uniform Guidelines “substantially deviate
from scientific knowledge and professional practice” and should be revised in light of more recent
research [53].
3 Empirical Findings
3.1 Methodology
Identifying companies offering algorithmic pre-employment assessments. In order to
get a broad overview of the emerging industry surrounding algorithmic pre-employment assess-
ments, we conducted a systematic review of assessment vendors. We identified 322 companies
providing these assessments by combining the top 300 start-up companies (by funding amount)
on Crunchbase under its “recruiting” category4 with an inventory of relevant companies found in
reports by Upturn [10] and RedThread Research [34]. 39 of these companies did not have English-
language websites, so we excluded them. Recall that the hiring pipeline has four primary stages
(sourcing, screening, interviewing, and selection); we ruled out vendors that do not provide assess-
ment services at the screening stage, leaving us with 45 vendors. Note that this excluded companies
that merely provide online job boards or marketplaces like Monster.com and Upwork. 21 of the
remaining vendors did not obviously use any predictive technology (e.g., coding interview platforms
that only evaluated correctness or rule-based screening) or did not offer explicit assessments (e.g.,
scraping candidate information from other sources), and an additional 5 did not provide enough
information for us to make concrete determinations, leaving us with 19 vendors in our sample. With
these 19 vendors, in April 2019, we recorded administrative information available on Crunchbase
(approximate number of employees, location, and total funding) and undertook a review of their
claims and practices, which we explain below.
Documenting vendors’ claims and practices. Based on prior frameworks intended to inter-
rogate machine learning pipelines for bias [5, 47], we ask the following questions of vendors:
3It should be noted that this description is based on a particular (although the most common) interpretation of
Title VII. Legal scholars contend that Title VII may offer stronger protections to minorities [11, 45], and there is
disagreement on how (or whether) to operationalize the 4/5 rule through statistical tests [70, 18, 71, 19]. For the
purposes of this work, we will not consider alternative interpretations of Title VII, nor will we get into the specifics
of how exactly violations of the 4/5 rule should be detected.
4https://www.crunchbase.com/hub/recruiting-startups
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• What types of assessments do they provide? (Questions? Videos? What are the features?)
• What is the target variable they aim to predict (e.g., sales revenue or employee evaluations)?
• Where do the training data come from? Do they train on data from the client, or do they
use their own data sources?
• What information do they provide on the validation of their assessments? Do they release
validation studies or whitepapers?
• What concrete claims or guarantees (if any) do they provide regarding discrimination? When
applicable, how do they achieve these guarantees?
To answer these questions, we exhaustively searched the website of each company. This in-
cluded downloading any reports or whitepapers they provided and watching webinars found on
their websites. Almost all vendors provided an option to request a demo; we avoided doing so since
our focus is on accessible and public information. Sometimes, company websites were quite sparse
on information, and we were unable to conclusively answer all questions for all companies.
3.2 Findings
Figure 1: Description of the pymetrics process (screenshot from the pymetrics website: https:
//www.pymetrics.com/employers/)
In our review, we found 19 vendors providing algorithmically driven pre-employment assess-
ments. Those that had available funding information on Crunchbase (17 out of 19) ranged in
funding from around $1 million to $93 million. Most vendors (15) had 50 or fewer employees, and
roughly half (9) were based in the United States. 16 vendors were present in Crunchbase’s “Recruit-
ing Startups” list; the remaining vendors were taken from reports by Upturn [10] and RedThread
Research [34]. Many vendors were present in all of these sources. Table 1 summarizes our findings.
Table 3 in Appendix A contains administrative information about the vendors we included.
Assessment types. The types of assessments offered varied by vendor. The most popular assess-
ment types were questions (12 vendors), video interview analysis (6 vendors), and gameplay (e.g.,
puzzles or video games) (6 vendors). Note that many vendors (e.g., HireVue) offered multiple types
of assessments. Question-based assessments included personality tests, situational judgment tests,
and other formats. For video interviews, candidates were typically either asked to record answers to
particular questions or more free-form “video resumes” highlighting their strengths. These videos
are then algorithmically analyzed by vendors.
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Vendor name Assessment types Adverse impact Custom? Validation info
8 and Above phone, video – S –
ActiView VR assessment – C validation claimed
Applied questions – – –
Assessment Innovation games, questions – – –
Good&Co questions adverse impact C, P multiple studies
Harver games, questions – S –
HireVue games, questions, video 4/5 rule C, P –
Knockri video – S –
Koru questions adverse impact S some description
LaunchPad Recruits questions, video – – –
Plum.io questions, games – S validation claimed
PredictiveHire questions 4/5 rule C –
Scoutible games – C –
Teamscope questions – S, P –
ThriveMap questions – C –
Yobs video adverse impact C, S –
impress.ai questions – S –
myInterview video compliance – –
pymetrics games 4/5 rule C small case study
Table 1: Examining the websites of vendors of algorithmic pre-employment assessments, we answer
a number of questions regarding their assessments in relation to questions of fairness and bias. This
involves exhaustively searching their websites, downloading whitepapers they provide, and watching
webinars they make available. This table presents our findings. In the “Custom?” column, C
denotes “custom” (uses employer data), S denotes “semi-custom” (qualitatively tailored to employer
without data) and P denotes “pre-built.” In the “Adverse impact” column, the recorded phrases
were found on the websites of the vendors in question.
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Vendor Claim about bias
HireVue Provide “a highly valid, bias-mitigated assessment”
pymetrics “. . . the Pre-Hire assessment does not show bias against women or mi-
nority respondents.”
PredictiveHire “AI bias is testable, hence fixable.”
Knockri “Knockri’s A.I. is unbiased because of its full spectrum database that
ensures there’s no benchmark of what the ‘ideal candidate’ looks like.”
Table 2: Examples of claims that vendors make about bias, taken from their websites.
Target variables and training data. Most of the vendors (15) offer custom or customizable
assessments, adapting the assessment to the client’s particular data or job requirements. 8 of these
build assessments based on data from the client’s past and current employees (see Figure 1). Ven-
dors in general leave it up to clients to determine what outcomes they want to predict, including
performance reviews, sales numbers, and retention time. Other vendors who offer customizable
assessments without using client data either use human expertise to determine which of a pre-
determined set of competencies are most relevant to the particular job (the vendor’s analysis of a
job role or a client’s knowledge of relevant requirements) or don’t explicitly specify their prediction
targets. In such cases, the vendor provides an assessment that scores applicants on various compe-
tencies, which are then combined into a “fit” score based on a custom formula. Thus, even among
vendors who tailor their assessments to a client, they do so in different ways.
Vendors who only offer pre-built assessments typically either provide assessments designed for
a particular job role (e.g., salesperson), or provide a sort of “competency report” with scores on a
number of cognitive or behavioral traits (e.g., leadership, grit, teamwork). These assessments are
closer in spirit to traditional psychometric assessments like the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator or Big
Five Personality Test; however, unlike traditional assessments that produce scores based on a small
number of questions, modern assessments differ in that they may build a psychographic profile by
using machine learning to analyze a rich data source like a video or gameplay.
Validation. Very few vendors provide concrete information on the validation of their assessments,
although some vendors claim to validate their models without providing details. Good & Co.,5 no-
tably, provides fairly rigorous validation studies of the psychometric component to their assessment,
as well as a detailed audit of how the scores differ across demographic groups; however, they do
not provide similar documentation justifying the algorithmic techniques they use to recommend
candidates based on “culture fit.”
Accounting for bias. In total, while 14 of the vendors made at least abstract references to
“bias” (sometimes in the context of well-established human bias in hiring), only 7 vendors explicitly
discussed compliance or adverse impact with respect to the assessments they offered. 3 vendors
explicitly mentioned the 4/5 rule, and an additional 4 advertised “compliance” or claimed to control
adverse impact more generally. Several of these vendors claimed to test their models for bias,
“fixing” it when it appeared. HireVue, in particular, offered a detailed description of their approach
to de-biasing, which involves removing features correlated with protected attributes when adverse
5https://good.co/
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impact is detected. Other vendors (e.g., pymetrics, Knockri, and PredictiveHire) claimed to “fix”
adverse impact when it is found without going into the details of how they do this.
Among those that do make concrete claims, all vendors we examined specifically focus on
equality of outcomes and compliance with the 4/5 rule. Roughly speaking, there are two ways in
which vendors claim to achieve these goals: naturally unbiased assessments and active algorithmic
de-biasing. Typically, vendors claiming to provide naturally unbiased assessments seek to measure
some underlying cognitive or behavioral traits, so the outcome of an assessment is a small number
of scores, one for each competency being measured. These scores can then be combined to form a
single number (often known as a “fit” score) based on the competencies deemed necessary for the
particular role being selected for. Koru, for instance, measures 7 traits (e.g., “grit” and “presence”)
and claims that “[i]n all panels since 2015, the Pre-Hire assessment does not show bias against
women or minority respondents” [42]. When a vendor claims that an assessment like this is naturally
unbiased, it means that the distribution of scores is similar across demographic groups.
Other vendors actively intervene in their learned models to remove biases. One technique that
we have observed across multiple vendors (e.g., HireVue, pymetrics, PredictiveHire) is the following:
build a model and test it for adverse impact against various subgroups.6 If adverse impact is found,
the model and/or data are modified to try to remove it, and then the model is tested again for
adverse impact. HireVue downweights or removes features found to be highly correlated with
the protected attribute in question, noting that this can significantly reduce adverse impact while
having little effect on the predictive accuracy of the assessment. In Section 4.3, we will provide an
in-depth discussion of these efforts to define and guarantee the removal of bias.
4 Analysis of Technical Concerns
Our findings in Section 3 raise several concerns about the pre-employment assessment process.
While not an exhaustive list of the myriad vectors for algorithmic bias, we focus our attention on
three particular areas identified in our empirical review. Creating assessments via ML requires
the collection of data from which a predictive model can be learned. In order to do so, a vendor
must make several data choices—for example, they may train models to predict success based on
the employees the client has chosen to hire in the past. Vendors may choose to use alternative
assessment formats like game-based assessments or analysis of recorded video interviews that
produce far more features and require more complex ML tools than traditional question-based
assessments. Finally, many vendors take steps to detect or remove bias in their assessments,
leading to various “de-biasing” methodologies. In the remainder of this section, we analyze vendors
with regard to these three practices.
Our analysis does not intend to suggest that all or even most of the vendors surveyed are
handling these concerns poorly; many actively think about and try to address them. However, we
find it useful to survey some of the issues that may arise when machine learning techniques are
used to attempt to predict job performance, especially since it is often not obvious which vendors
are particularly diligent when it comes to preventing biased assessments.
4.1 Data Choices
Machine learning is often viewed as a process by which we predict a given output from a given set
of inputs. In reality, neither the inputs nor outputs are fixed in a learning pipeline. Where do the
6pymetrics, for instance, open-sources the tests it uses: https://github.com/pymetrics/audit-ai
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data come from? What is the “right” outcome to predict? These and others are crucial decisions
in the ML pipeline, and their impacts on the bias of a system should not be discounted.
Custom assessments. Consider a hypothetical practitioner who sets out to create a custom
assessment to determine who the “best” candidates are for her client. As is the case in many
domains, translating this to a feasible data-driven task forces our practitioner to make certain
compromises [59]. It quickly becomes clear that she must somehow operationalize “best” in some
measurable way. What does the client value? Sales numbers? Cultural fit? Retention? And,
crucially, what data does the client have? This is a nontrivial constraint: many companies don’t
maintain comprehensive and accessible data about employee performance, and thus, a practitioner
may be forced to do the best she can with the limited data that she is given [14]. Note that relying
on the client’s data has already forced the practitioner to only learn from the client’s existing
employees; at the outset, at least, she has no way to get data on how those who weren’t hired
would have performed.
Once a target is identified, the practitioner needs a dataset on which to train a model. Since
she has performance data on previous employees, she needs them to take the assessment so she can
link their assessment performance to their observed job performance. How many employees does
she need data from in order to get an accurate model? What if certain employees don’t want to or
don’t have time to take the assessment? Might there be some sort of response bias? Is the set of
employees who respond representative of the larger applicant pool who will ultimately be judged
based on this assessment?
Finally, the practitioner is in a position to actually build a model. Along the way, however,
she had to make several key choices, often based on factors (like client data availability) outside
her control. The choice of target variable is particularly salient. Proxies like job evaluations, for
instance, have been found to display biases towards minorities [72, 56, 64]. Moreover, predicting the
success of future employees based on current employees inherently skews the task towards finding
candidates who resemble those who have already been hired.
Some vendors go beyond trying to identify candidates who are generically good, or even good for
a particular client, and explicitly focus on finding candidates who “fit” with an existing employee
or team. Both Good & Co. and Teamscope provide tools for employers to find candidates who
are compatible with members of a current team. Good & Co. further advertises their assessments
as a way to “[r]eplicate your top performers.”7 When models are fit and customized at such a
small scale, it can be quite difficult to determine what it means for such a model to be biased or
discriminatory. In principle, any role at any company could have its own version of a predictive
model, tailor-made for the particular team a candidate would be joining. Does each one need to
be audited for bias? How would a vendor go about doing so?
And yet, while it is easy to criticize vendors for the choices they make, it’s not clear that there
are better alternatives. In practice, it is impossible to even define, let alone collect data on, an
objective measure of a “good” employee. Nor is it always feasible to get data on a completely
representative sample of candidates. Vendors and advocates argue that many of the potentially
problematic elements here (subjective evaluations; biased historical samples; emphasis on fit) are
equally present, if not more so, in traditional human hiring practices [16].
Customizable and pre-built assessments. Instead of building a new custom assessment for
each client, it may be tempting to instead offer a pre-built assessment (perhaps specific to a par-
ticular type of job) that has been validated across data from a variety of clients. This has the
7https://good.co/pro/
10
advantage that it isn’t subject to the idiosyncratic data of each client, and moreover, it can draw
from a more diverse range of candidates and employees to learn a broader notion of what a “good”
employee looks like. Additionally, pre-built assessments may be attractive to clients who do not
have enough existing employees from whom a custom assessment can be built.
Some vendors offer assessments that are mostly pre-built but somewhat customizable. Koru and
Plum.io, for example, provide pre-built assessments to evaluate a fixed number of competencies.
Experts then analyze the job description and role for a particular client and determine which
competencies are most important for the client’s needs. Thus, these vendors hope to get the best
of both worlds: assessments validated on large populations that are still flexible enough to adapt to
the specific requirements of each client. As shown in Figure 2, the firm 8 and Above profiles over
60 traits based on a video interview, but reports a single “Elev8” score tailored to the particular
client.
Figure 2: Part of a sample candidate profile from 8 and Above, based on a 30-second recorded video
cover letter (screenshot from the 8 and Above website: https://www.8andabove.com/p/profile/
blueprint/643)
Necessary trade-offs. Despite these benefits, pre-built assessments do have drawbacks. Indi-
vidual competencies like “grit” or “openness” are themselves constructs, and attempts to measure
them must rely on other psychometric assessments as “ground truth.” Given that traits can be
measured by multiple tests that don’t perfectly correlate with one another [66], it may be difficult
to create an objective benchmark against which to compare an algorithmic assessment. Further-
more, it is generally considered good practice to build and validate assessments on a representative
population for a particular job role [32], and both underlying candidate pools and job specifics differ
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across locations, companies, and job descriptions. Pre-built assessments are not trained directly on
a client’s outcome data, and therefore may not adapt well to the particular requirements a client
has.
This leads to an inherently challenging technical problem: on the one hand, more data is usually
beneficial in creating and validating an assessment; on the other hand, drawing upon data from
related but somewhat different sources may lead to inaccurate conclusions. We can view this as
an instance of domain adaptation and the bias-variance tradeoff, well studied in the statistics and
machine learning literature [6, 33]. Pooling data from multiple companies or geographic locations
may reduce variance due to small sample sizes at a particular company, but comes at the cost of
biasing the outcomes away from the client’s specific needs. There is no obvious answer or clear
best practice here, and vendors and clients must carefully consider the pros and cons of various
assessment types. Larger clients may be better positioned for vendors to build custom assessments
based solely on their data; smaller clients may turn to pre-built assessments, making the assumption
that the candidate pool and job role on which the assessment was built is sufficiently similar to
warrant generalizing its conclusions.
4.2 Alternative Assessment Formats
Once an assessment has been built, it must be validated to verify that it performs as expected. Psy-
chologists have developed extensive standards to guide creators of assessments in this process [32];
however, modern assessment vendors are pushing the boundaries of assessment formats far beyond
the pen-and-paper tests of old, often with little regulatory oversight [15]. Game- and video-based
assessments, in particular, are becoming increasingly common. Vendors point to an emerging line
of literature showing that features derived from these modern assessment formats correlate with
job outcomes and personality traits [50, 36] as evidence that these assessments truly do contain
information that can be predictive of job outcomes, though they rarely release rigorous validation
studies of their own.
Technical challenges for alternative assessments. While there is evidence for their predictive
validity, it is important to bear in mind that empirical correlation is no substitute for theoretical
justification. Historically, IO psychologists have designed assessments based on their research-
driven knowledge that certain traits correlate with desirable outcomes. To some extent, machine
learning attempts to automate this process by discovering relationships (e.g., between actions in a
video game and personality traits) instead of quantifying known relationships. Of course, machine
learning can be used to unearth truly important relationships. But it may also find relationships
that experts don’t understand. When the expert is unable to explain why, for example, the cadence
of a candidate’s voice is indicative of higher job performance, or why reaction time predicts employee
retention, should a vendor rely on these features? From a technical perspective, correlations that
cannot be justified may fail to generalize well or remain stable over time, and in light of such
concerns, the APA Principles caution that a practitioner should “establish a clear rationale for
linking the resulting scores to the criterion constructs of interest” [32]. Yet when an algorithm
takes in “millions of data points” for each candidate (as advertised by pymetrics8), it may not be
possible to provide a qualitative justification for the inclusion of each feature.
Moreover, automated discovery of relationships makes it difficult for a critical expert to detect
the use of a problematic relationship, especially because rich sources of data can easily encode or
correlate with properties that are unethical or illegal to use in the hiring process. Facial analysis,
8https://perma.cc/3284-WTS8
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in particular, has been heavily scrutinized recently. A wave of studies has shown that several
commercially available facial analysis techniques suffer from disparities in error rates across gender
and racial lines [12, 62, 63]. Because it can be quite expensive and technically challenging to build
facial analysis software in-house, vendors will often turn to third parties (e.g., Affectiva9) who
provide facial analysis as a service. As a result, vendors lack the ability or resources to thoroughly
audit the software they use. With these concerns in mind, U.S. Senators Kamala Harris, Patty
Murray, and Elizabeth Warren recently wrote a letter to the EEOC asking for a report on the
legality and potential issues with the use of facial analysis in pre-employment assessments [39].
Even more recently, Illinois passed a law requiring applicants to be notified and provide consent
if their video interviews will be analyzed by artificial intelligence [3], though it’s not clear what
happens if an applicant refuses to consent.
While heightened publicity regarding racial disparities in facial analysis has prompted many
third-party vendors of this technology to respond by improving the performance of their tools on
minority populations [61, 65], it remains unclear what information facial analysis relies on to draw
conclusions about candidates. Facial expressions may contain information about a range of sensitive
attributes from obvious ones like ethnicity, gender, and age to more subtle traits like a candidate’s
mental and physical health [50, 77]. Moreover, for ethical and legal reasons, vendors for the most
part cannot and should not collect information about attributes like candidates’ health [22], making
it difficult or even impossible to detect whether the relatively opaque deep learning models used
for facial analysis inadvertently learn proxies for prohibited features.
4.3 Detecting and Removing Bias
Even when an assessment has been validated, it still has the potential to lead to biased outcomes.
To this end, many vendors take steps to ensure that their assessments don’t display certain forms
of bias. Here, we evaluate how vendors detect and mitigate bias, placing their techniques in the
context of bias-removal efforts in related domains.
Inherent challenges in defining unbiased assessments. Formally defining what it means
for an assessment to be biased is an intrinsically difficult task. It is impossible to separate notions
of fairness and bias from the politics and values that underpin them. Different stakeholders have
different conceptions of what it means to be fair, and these are not always compatible with one
another [17, 48].
For example, the EEOC Guidelines’ push towards minimizing avoidable inequalities in out-
comes is at odds with the APA Principles, which define unbiased assessments as those that have
neither differential validity (disparities in accuracy between subgroups) nor differential prediction
(where the optimal mapping from features to predictions differs between subgroups) [20, 32]. Given
these competing conceptions of fair assessment, it is not obvious how the tension between them
should be resolved. Beyond this disagreement in goals, classical techniques used to examine bias in
assessments typically consider the case where scores are determined using regression [32, 76], which
is much more tractable to analyze than more modern machine learning techniques.
Moreover, normative decisions regarding the formalization of bias are subject to practical and
technical constraints. Outcome-based notions of bias are intimately tied to the datasets on which
they are evaluated. As both the EEOC Guidelines and APA Principles clearly articulate, a repre-
sentative sample is crucial for validation [20, 32]. The same holds true for claims regarding bias:
disparities in outcomes (or the lack thereof) may depend on whether the assessment is being taken
9https://www.affectiva.com/
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by recent college grads in Michigan applying for sales positions or high school dropouts in New York
applying for jobs stocking warehouses. It may be especially hard to find a representative sample
when minority populations are small—does a vendor have enough sample videos of individuals with
disabilities to verify that its algorithms aren’t (perhaps inadvertently) discriminatory? And even
if they do, is it possible for applicants or government regulators to challenge such claims? Again,
there is no obvious answer here: certain populations are inherently small or hard to identify, mak-
ing it challenging both for vendors seeking to provide quality service and for regulators seeking to
protect marginalized groups. Thus, while it is tempting to look for simple technical definitions of
fairness and bias, there are significant barriers to implementing even simple constraints in practice.
With these challenges in mind, consider the role of our hypothetical data scientist in producing
unbiased assessments. How does she operationalize abstract notions of fairness and equity? What
values is she implicitly building into the system? And, importantly, to what extent are her choices
shaped by financial and legal constraints?
As noted in Section 3, several vendors guarantee that their assessments are “unbiased” by
building a model, testing it for adverse impact (using statistical tests aimed at the 4/5 rule), and
modifying the weights or features used until they are satisfied. From a vendor’s perspective, this
strict adherence to the 4/5 rule can be seen as a logical business decision: given the legal uncertainty
surrounding machine learning in the context of hiring, both vendors and their clients prefer to
steer clear of any regulatory trouble. In order to better understand how and why this variant of
algorithmic de-biasing has come to be, it is useful to place it in the context of how bias is handled
in other domains.
De-biasing in related domains. Questions regarding the measurement and removal of bias are
by no means unique to algorithmic hiring; to our knowledge, however, the particular approaches
taken by vendors of algorithmic pre-employment assessments are not widely used in other contexts.
To shed some light as to why this is the case, we examine practices from lending, educational
testing, and historical methods from pre-employment assessments for comparison. In this context,
we will consider the justification for algorithmic de-biasing techniques used by vendors like HireVue
and pymetrics and discuss some of the legal questions they raise.
In lending, creditors use statistical models to determine who to offer loans. Discrimination in
lending with respect to protected attributes (e.g., race, color, religion, national origin, and sex) is
prohibited by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) [13]. To address any potential disparate
impact generated by their use of statistical models, creditors attempt to justify their selection
procedures by inspecting each feature in their models and developing some qualitative defense
for its inclusion. In particular, lenders often seek to ensure that there is an “understandable
relationship” between a given feature and creditworthiness [58] — a story that lenders can tell
to explain a feature’s relevance. This approach permits objections to the use of certain features,
regardless of their predictive value; at the same time, it allows for the use of qualitatively justified
features that may result in avoidably unequal selection rates.
In educational testing, Scheuneman introduced the idea of Differential Item Functioning (DIF),
which defined an item (i.e., test question or section) as unbiased if, conditioned on the outcome
target of the tests, different groups had equal performance on the item [68]. Thus, an item demon-
strates DIF if individuals from different subgroups with similar overall scores perform differently
on that particular item [29]. Under this definition, individual items could be analyzed for bias and
modified or removed [60]. Similarly, algorithmic assessment vendors consider individual features to
control biased outcomes; however, they differ in that vendors target features correlated with a pro-
tected attribute, while DIF looks for such correlation conditioned on “ability,” as measured by the
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test itself. Crucially, this distinction implies that DIF still allows for group differences in outcome:
score distributions or selection rates can look arbitrarily different for a test that is “unbiased”
under DIF, as long as those differences can be explained by disparities in underlying qualification
or ability.10 Assessment vendors engaged in the active de-biasing we observe, on the other hand,
explicitly control the outcomes they produce, effectively scrubbing their data of correlations to
protected attributes until outcomes are equalized to within a tolerable range.
Finally, we find it instructive to consider the methods used in the General Aptitude Test Battery
(GATB), a pre-employment assessment developed in the 1940s by the US Employment Service to
match job-seekers to employers. The GATB was quickly found to have an adverse impact on ethnic
minorities [69]. In response, results were reported as within-group percentile scores by ethnicity—
black, Hispanic, and other—instead of raw scores [25]. A National Academy of Sciences study was
commissioned to consider, among other factors, the justification for such a policy. The report found
evidence of both differential validity and differential prediction; that is, both the predictive validity
of the test and the optimal scoring rule (to produce a score from the raw responses) differed across
racial groups [25]. Moreover, the report noted that for a given level of job performance, minority
candidates tended to perform worse on the test [25]. As a result, they found that without within-
group reporting, minority applicants would suffer from “higher false-rejection rates” [25], leading
them to recommend the continued reporting of within-group percentiles. Note that unlike the
techniques used in lending and educational testing, the GATB’s within-groups percentile reporting
was designed to equalize outcomes: by definition, equal proportions of each subgroup would be
above any particular percentile score.
The design of algorithmic de-biasing. In principle, any of the above techniques (and surely
many more from other domains) could have been used to mitigate bias in algorithmic pre-employment
assessment. Why did vendors settle upon adverse impact testing and post-hoc corrections? Part of
the answer lies in the fact that many modern assessments include tens of thousands of features per
applicant, and it would be infeasible to manually inspect and justify each one as done in lending.
Even more salient is the fact that while the 4/5 rule is by no means a hard constraint, vendors have
an incentive to treat it as such: their clients do not want to risk running afoul of Title VII and
EEOC guidelines. Thus, although inspecting individual inputs for bias, as is done in lending or
educational testing, could be legally compliant, vendors face pressure to control the selection rates
of the assessments they produce to satisfy the 4/5 rule.
In principle, within-group reporting of scorse as found in the GATB would lead to compliance
with the 4/5 rule, and as some computer scientists have argued, doing so may be the optimal way to
equalize selection rates [24]; so why don’t vendors use it? In fact, there are strong technical, legal,
and political reasons not to do so. From a technical perspective, it is significant that protected
attributes are intersectional : an individual can belong to multiple protected groups based on race,
gender, age, and other attributes. Because racial discrepancies observed in the GATB were so
salient, administrators chose to report within-group percentiles by race, but if outcomes were to
vary significantly by gender or age as well, vendors might need to report percentiles within a large
number of intersectional subgroups. Perhaps more importantly, within-group reporting would likely
be considered illegal today. In 1986 the Department of Justice challenged the legality of within-
group scoring in employment assessment on the grounds that it constituted explicitly disparate
treatment [69]. While the U.S. National Research Council found that within-group scoring was
necessary to prevent unjustifiable adverse impact in the GATB, the practice was effectively outlawed
10In the extreme, a test can pass all candidates from one group and none from another and still be unbiased as
measured by DIF.
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by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 [23]. Moreover, vendors may also find it politically infeasible to
adopt such a solution, as it would effectively constitute an admission that the underlying assessment
performs quite differently for different subgroups.
Implications. Despite the perhaps good reasons not to follow precedents for the detection and
removal of bias set in a number of related domains, there are still important consequences of
algorithmic de-biasing that are worth considering.
First, discrimination and the 4/5 rule should not be conflated. Vendors may find it necessary from
a legal or business perspective to build models that satisfy the 4/5 rule, but this is not a substitute
for a critical analysis into the mechanisms by which bias and harm manifest in an assessment. For
example, differential validity, which occurs when an assessment is better at ranking members of
one group than another, should be a top-level concern when examining an assessment [32, 76]. But
because of the legal emphasis placed on adverse impact, vendors have little incentive to structure
their techniques around it.
Moreover, bias is not limited to the task of predicting outputs from inputs. Vendors should
critically examine the system of producing an assessment as a whole. Where do inputs and outputs
come from, and what justification do they have? Are there features that shouldn’t be used? This
isn’t to say that some vendors are not already asking these questions; however, in the interest
of forming industry standards surrounding algorithmic assessments, we believe that the public
emphasis on the 4/5 rule as a definition of bias runs the risk of downplaying the importance of
examining a system as a whole, as opposed to ensuring the narrow property that selection rates
should be roughly equal.
From a policy perspective, the EEOC can and should clarify its position on the use of algorithmic
de-biasing techniques. As of now, their legality is unclear, and they have yet to be challenged to
our knowledge. While existing guidelines can be argued to apply to ML-based assessments, the
de-biasing techniques described above do present new opportunities and challenges. Suppose, for
instance, that a vendor supplies a model that results in adverse impact. It might argue that the
model is properly validated, and that its use constitutes a business necessity. If, however, the vendor
could have reduced the adverse impact through algorithmic de-biasing without significantly reducing
predictive ability, should this be considered an “alternative business practice” and therefore render
the vendor or employer liable for not using it? And if so, does this imply that algorithmic de-
biasing should be required for all vendors? Existing guidelines do not answer these questions, and
both vendors and candidates could benefit from the EEOC taking a concrete stance on de-biasing
techniques.
5 Discussion
In this work, we have presented an in-depth analysis into the bias-related practices of vendors
of algorithmic pre-employment assessments. Our findings have implications not only for hiring
pipelines, but more broadly for investigations into algorithmic and socio-technical systems. Given
the proprietary and sensitive nature of models built for actual clients, it is infeasible to perform
a traditional audit; despite this, we are able to glean valuable information simply by delving into
vendors’ publicly available statements. Broadly speaking, models result from the application of a
vendor’s practices to a real-world setting. Thus, by learning about these practices, we can draw
conclusions and raise relevant questions about the resultant models. In doing so, we can create a
common vocabulary with which we can discuss and compare models and practices. This analysis
demonstrates the value of transparency: the more vendors disclose about their practices, the more
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confidently we can assess the models that they are likely to produce. From a vendor’s perspective,
they have the ability to shape industry standards and best practices through the information that
they disclose publicly, and they have an incentive to ensure that the industry as a whole remains
both legally and socially acceptable.
In analyzing models via practices, we observe that it is both useful and important to consider
technical systems in conjunction with the context surrounding their use and deployment. It would
be difficult to understand vendors’ design decisions without paying attention to the relevant legal,
historical, and social influences.
Finally, we found it useful to limit the scope of our inquiry in order to be able to ask and
answer concrete questions. Even just considering algorithms used in the context of hiring, we found
enough heterogeneity (as have previous reports on the subject [10, 34]) that it was necessary to
further refine our focus to those used in pre-employment assessments. While this did lead us to
exclude a number of innovative and intriguing uses of technology in the hiring pipeline (see, e.g.,
Textio11 or Jopwell12), it allowed us to make specific and direct comparisons between vendors and
get a more detailed understanding of the technical challenges specific to assessments.
Our work leads naturally to a range of questions, ranging from those that seem quite technical
(What is the effect of algorithmic de-biasing on model outputs? When should data from other
sources be incorporated?) to socio-political (What additional regulatory constraints could improve
the use of algorithms in assessment? How can assessments promote the autonomy and dignity of
candidates?). We believe that none of these questions can be completely addressed without drawing
from a broad range of perspectives. Because the systems we examine are shaped by technical, legal,
political, and social forces, taking an interdisciplinary view allows us to get a broader picture of
both the problems they face and the potential avenues for improvement.
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A Administrative Information on Vendors
Vendor name Funding # of employees Location
8 and Above – 1-10 WA, USA
ActiView $6.5M 11-50 Israel
Applied £2M 11-50 UK
Assessment Innovation $1.3M 1-10 NY, USA
Good&Co $10.3M 51-100 CA, USA
Harver $14M 51-100 NY, USA
HireVue $93M 251-500 UT, USA
Knockri – 11-50 Canada
Koru $15.6M 11-50 WA, USA
LaunchPad Recruits £2M 11-50 UK
Plum.io $1.9M 11-50 Canada
PredictiveHire A$4.3M 11-50 Australia
Scoutible $6.5M 1-10 CA, USA
Teamscope e800K 1-10 Estonia
ThriveMap £781K 1-10 UK
Yobs $1M 11-50 CA, USA
impress.ai $1.4M 11-50 Singapore
myInterview $1.4M 1-10 Australia
pymetrics $56.6M 51-100 NY, USA
Table 3: Administrative information
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